



THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT AND NIGERIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY

Aituaje POGOSON

Department of Political Science

University of Ibadan, Ibadan,

Nigeria

irenepogoso@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

Nation-states in the contemporary global system face a variety of threats that challenge not only their national security, but also the continued existence of the state as a sovereign entity. Historically, the enemies of the state were from the external environment. However, the security environment in the world today has undergone rapid and constant change. Globalisation has increasingly led to domestication of the external environment, on the one hand, and externalisation of the domestic environment, on the other, thereby blurring the boundaries between the domestic and the external. Global security issues such as terrorism, illegal migration, cybercrime, trafficking of drugs, arms and persons, exemplify the inseparability of internal and external security environments. This has further compounded the security complex of nation-states, since the external enemies of the state now infiltrate domestic actors and effectively use them against the state. Against this background, the Nigerian state, like the case in other developing countries with fledging state institutions, has come under serious security threat. This situation requires comprehensive threat assessment and proactive framework of deterrence and containment. This paper examines the challenge of national security in a world of infinite access and unpredictable penetration.

Keywords: *External environment, national security, trans border crime, cybercrime, arms proliferation*

INTRODUCTION

National security refers to the ability of the government to protect the state and its citizens against threats and dangers. It can be seen as a situation or condition where the cherished values and beliefs, institutions of governance, unity and well-being of the people and the nation are protected and enhanced (Watson, 2008). National security thinking has grown beyond the emphasis on military power to encompass a broad range of factors. Accordingly, national security of a state now encompasses military security, economic security, energy security, environmental security, cyber security and even human security. Threats to national security now involve not only conventional foes such as other nation-states but also non-state actors and even natural disasters and climate change (Paleri, 2008 & Romm, 1993).

In contemporary global system, nation-states have come under diverse threats that have the potentials to undermine their national security. These threats emanate from both internal and external sources. Yet, there is still a challenge of how countries make sense of the world beyond their domain. While it may seem that geographical demarcations help to make meaning of what constitutes the external domain, the exact constituent of the external world remains ambiguous and, since nations are essentially an imagined community (Anderson 1991), physical and geographical criterion may not be sufficient in delineating what is external to a nation-state. What is perhaps most important is the way in which the constituent parts of the nation-state imagine themselves in relation with the outside world and the modes of affection and solidarity they deem themselves to have with people that may not share similar attachments. This is particularly obvious in the context of national groups within states with firm attachments with groups that exist outside the domain of their state. For instance, there are Germans in Austria, French in Belgium, Yorubas in Benin and in the Caribbean, Jews in the Diaspora and indeed several national groups within specific nation-states which have close ties with their national correlates in the United States, due to years of migration across the Atlantic. This blurs the conceptualization of what constitutes the external environment of any state.

There is growing acknowledgement that in the modern world, the operations of enemies of a nation-state are not located in the external domain alone. This argument was, particularly vigorously advocated by Senator Joseph McCarthy who in the 1950s hinted at the possibility of the Soviet Union undermining the national security of the United States through its



operations within several institutions of the United States (See : Caute, 1978 & Schrecker, 1998). Concerns of quisling and of fifth columnist have also raised the possibility of national security threats emanating from external sources working from within nation states rather than from without (Strong, 1949 & 1956). Moreover, in an era where environmental issues are becoming very central and have increasingly been regarded as a source of insecurity to nation-states as observed by Trombetta, (2008), one wonders whether the environment can be safely left out as a part of the external threats.

Importantly, any attempt to make sense of the external environment of a country has to take into account the complexity of the concept (Tiimonen & Nikander, 2016). The primary preoccupation of this endeavour, however, is to identify the varying ways in which the external environment constitutes a threat to Nigeria's national security. To engage this issue, we have divided this paper into four parts. The first section introduces the paper. The second section explores the contentious issue of what constitutes the external environment as well as identify national security as an enduring issue in the history of international relations, as well as identify the changing concerns of national security over the years. The third section identifies the various external threats to Nigeria's national security while the final section is the conclusion of the paper.

External Environment

In the study of International Relations, there is the tendency to assume that the 'international' or 'the external' are set of natural givens of life. Yet, international history is replete with information about the ways in which the landscape of what constitutes the external environment has been negotiated and renegotiated. Indeed, one of the enduring stories of international history is the way in which the international domain and the domestic environment of political units have been subject to reordering and redefinition. Much of the literature in international relations treat the international or external environment as a monolithic story, constituting a unilineal trajectory of sameness and persistence throughout human history (Waltz, 1979). As Waltz (1979) emphasised, anarchy is an enduring feature of international relations and change in the international system is reduced to the rise and fall of great powers, a notion of the international stripped of spatial-temporal dynamics. Indeed, international relations have been characterised by the coexistence of the logics of anarchy and hierarchy at various times and to varying degrees (Hobson & Hobden, 2002).

While history offers us a theory of change and persistence in conceptualizing the international domain, the notion of 'othering/otherness' (Ashcroft, B., Griffiths, G., and Tiffin, H. 2000: 154-156) offers compelling insights in the attempt to make sense of what constitutes the external environment of nation states. This term has gained ground in much post-structuralist or postmodernist writings. In the context of this subject matter, it implies that states make sense of themselves in the context of how they imagine the others or those on the outside, implying that there is no *the self* in the absence of *the other*. This notion of 'otherness' is a powerful concept because it draws our attention to how notions of the self and the other are produced and the changes that have taken place in the way these concepts are understood. Indeed, competing notions of the self are produced within a specific geo-historical milieu. This contention between the self and its other was perhaps eminently acknowledged by Thucydides. Writing in the context of the Peloponnesian war between Athens and Sparta, he draws attention to the varying images that Athens had of its international environment. Indeed, in the Melian dialogue, Thucydides quotes the Athenian envoy as saying that 'right, as the word goes is only a matter between equals, while the strong do what they have to do, the weak suffer what they must' (Thucydides, 1951). By implication, the Athenians understood their international environment as constituting two classes of states, those who were sufficiently strong to contend with them and the weak states which they were bound to dominate, and that it was growth in the power of Sparta that



invoked fear in the minds of Athens. This, for Thucydides, was the cause of the Peloponnesian war between Athens and Sparta.

While Thucydides's explanation has been much received by contemporary International Relations scholarship to explain causes of war in international relations, not all philosophers and thinkers paid attention to geo-political issues in accounting for the causes of the Peloponnesian war. The topicality of the issue at that time invariably agitated the minds of philosophers most notably, Socrates and Plato. Plato argued that the untended growth of the luxurious life was what led the state to look beyond its frontiers for resources to meet the growing internal consumption of the Athenian city-state. To manage this problem, he advocated for a guardian class of philosopher-king to mediate the excesses of the class of artisans (Ebenstein, 2002).

Over the millennia, political units have understood their external domain in different light. More often they have tended to view those outside the empire or state as barbarians. This was particularly true of pre-modern China which saw itself as the Heavenly Kingdom where leaders received and lost the mandate of heaven (Pong 2017). At certain times, China was inward looking and tended to see the world beyond them as constituting no more than hordes of barbarians, at other times, China developed ties with other peoples, cultures and civilizations. During the Hellenic period, the Greeks developed a system of international relations that was centred around Greece, although this changed in successive periods, first under the rule of Alexander the great and later under the Roman Empire where the vision of a Roman peace and a Roman centred world predominated.

For the most part of the Middle Ages, however, a deep sense of introspection and provincialism developed across the world. In Europe, a symbolic referent is often made to the fact that stones once used to build bridges that connected peoples and cultures were broken down and used to build city walls (Ebenstein, 2002)). This was the prevailing picture in Europe from about 500-1000CE. As secular authority disintegrated as was evident in the collapse of the Roman Empire, the Church increasingly rose to fill the void left by secular reign. The authority of the church and more specifically the Papacy grew, culminating in the reign of the Holy Roman Empire till its authority came under challenge between the 14th and 17th centuries (See, Silva, 2016). For much of its reign, Europe defined the basis for understanding its external environment on the basis of Christendom. Here, the line of demarcation was made between the Christian world and the Islamic world in the medieval world and thus became the basis upon which the main fault lines between these two religions were drawn.

With the dawn of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, notions of the external world were tremendously revised. Firstly, knowledge of the natural world was altered, leading man to shift his knowledge of the natural world from one that saw the earth as the centre of the universe to one that saw the sun as the centre of the universe. Secondly, within Europe, those who had achieved some fair degree of advancement as a result of the triple revolutions in science, industry and politics felt the need to civilize other people thus initiating what Norbert Elias has called the Civilizing Process (cited in Jeyifo 2007). Thirdly, was the projection of this beyond Europe in what was called the civilizing mission, a project that was predicated on an agenda to know the world of 'others' beyond Europe through several exploratory missions.

These developments have markedly shaped notions of what constitutes the external world today for different peoples and civilizations and years of civilizational contact and migration have altered the sense of what it means to be external, away from the notion geographic demarcation. For Africa, though shaped by long records of migration since the out-migration of the first generation of mankind from Africa to other parts of the globe, its image of the external world has been markedly altered by the experience of slavery and colonisation. These developments led to forced migration of Africans from Africa to several locations across the Atlantic, historical experiences that have been crucial to the development of



notions of Pan-Africanism and black consciousness across the world (See Adu Boahen, 1985). Indeed, in the world of increased transnational and transcontinental connectedness, defining what constitutes the external world must be undertaken with caution because of the tendency to leave out many who have similar basis of identification as we do.

National Security

Just like many concepts in the social sciences, there is no single universally accepted definition of national security. The variety of definitions provides an overview of the many ways the concept is used. The concept still remains ambiguous, having originated from simpler definitions which initially emphasised the freedom from military threat and political coercion to later increase in sophistication and include other forms of non-military security as suited the circumstances of the time. Walter Lippmann, in 1943, defined it in terms of war saying that "a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war" (cited in Romm, 1993:5). Also, Harold Lasswell, in 1950, viewed national security as freedom from foreign dictation or external coercion" (cited in Romm, 1993:5).

In 1960, Arnold Wolfers, makes a distinction between the objective and the subjective meaning the term. According to Arnold Wolfers, national security objectively means the absence of threats to acquired values and subjectively, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked" (cited in Paleri, 2008:52). The 1996 definition propagated by the National Defence College of India accretes the elements of national power: "National security is an appropriate and aggressive blend of political resilience and maturity, human resources, economic structure and capacity, technological competence, industrial base and availability of natural resources and finally the military might" (Paleri, 2008). Harold Brown, U.S. Secretary of Defense from 1977 to 1981 in the Carter administration, expanded the definition of national security by including elements such as economic and environmental security: "national security then is the ability to preserve the nation's physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to preserve its nature, institution, and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its borders" (cited in Watson, 2008:281)

Charles Maier defined national security through the lens of national power: "National security... is best described as a capacity to control those domestic and foreign conditions that the public opinion of a given community believes necessary to enjoy its own self-determination or autonomy, prosperity and wellbeing" (cited in Romm, 1993:5). According to Paleri (2008), national security may be defined as: "the measurable state of the capability of a nation to overcome the multi-dimensional threats to the apparent well-being of its people and its survival as a nation-state at any given time, by balancing all instruments of state policy through governance, that can be indexed by computation, empirically or otherwise, and is extendable to global security by variables external to it" (p. 52). According to Premaratne (2016), national security can be defined as safeguarding the sovereignty, territorial integrity, citizenry and socioeconomic functionality of a nation from an aggressor intent on undermining a particular value aspect of a nation through violent or unjust means.

Although the idea of national security is fairly recent, humanity has nonetheless been concerned with security for aeons. Indeed, it could be safely argued that man's early security concern was how to safeguard himself from dangers emanating from nature. While these concerns still persist, improved knowledge over the years have given man increasing control over the repelling forces of nature, thus enabling humanity to assert increasing domination over natural forces. At the time when the community of men started was at the stage of hunting-gathering communities, insecurity mainly resulted from food shortage particularly during periods of famine, harm from natural disasters and from dangerous wild animals and fighting resulting from disagreement over food, sex and material desires (Gat, 2006).



The transition from hunting-gathering societies to agricultural or pastoral societies led to transformation not only in the ways of living in human societies but also to the kinds of security concerns that humans became exposed to. These societies developed out of the coalescing of complex hunting-gathering societies into village chiefdoms beginning from 10000BC and continued in the succeeding 8000 years (Gat, 2006). The main characteristic of this phase of human history is the ability of people in many parts of the world to produce their own food domestically and to selectively breed plants and animals. These developments gave rise to security concerns peculiar to that phase in human history. Security concerns emanated from food shortage resulting from famine, natural disasters, external aggression from other societies and slavery. These security concerns often led these societies to war against themselves. Others include threat from marauding hunting and gathering groups who raided communities for crops and livestock and also made away with women. These raiding attacks often led to conflict between the raiders and the members of the farming communities. However as hunters and gatherers were reducing in number, conflict took place between farming communities.

The industrial revolution equally transformed security concerns with the development of large urban centres and the industrialisation of war, developments that had huge implications for humanity as a whole. It is within the context of these transformations that the modern nation-state, as well as the notion of national security, developed. The concept of national security has been the subject of competing visions. Thomas Hobbes, writing in the Leviathan, proposed that the path to a viable internal political order to resolve man's concerns for individual and national security was for individuals to submit to a powerful sovereign (Gaskin,1998) Immanuel Kant proposed an alternative route, one that would involve that each state acknowledges the benefit of inter-state co-operation and collaboration, free trade and that states pursue their national security through a league or association of nations or international security (Kant, 1795) . Over the years, the concept of national security has come to refer to a complex of instruments ranging from political, economic, diplomatic and military mechanisms which states deploy in pursuit of its national security. The elements of national security include military security, political security, economic security and environmental security. Evidently, security has many dimensions. In terms of internal security, terrorist threats or major crime may cause a life-threatening danger. Other risks can likewise threaten the functioning of society or parts of a society. Cyber attacks are a prime example in this regard. Also,, immigration can cause problems if there is a lack of social integration, just as an interruption in the supply of energy or raw materials can disrupt an economy and undermine the well-being of the population. Environmental pollution can adversely affect health, and epidemics and diseases can become global challenges. In short, external developments affects internal security.

External threats to Nigeria's National Security

While what constitutes the external environment of a nation state is not unambiguous, most states delineate their external environment geographically. Yet, the concern with the external environment, particularly the modes or ways in which threats emanate from the external environment, presupposes that borders are merely useful for purposes of demarcating the sphere and domain of the nation-state. In fact, in the context of the enormous influence that events and developments elsewhere can have on the internal developments within states, one can hardly take for granted the diverse ways in which the international domain impacts the internal domain of states and vice versa. Some forms of external threats to national security discussed in this section include; terrorism, cybercrime, trans border crimes and arms proliferation

Terrorism



Since the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks on the United States, terrorism has emerged as a global concern. Indeed, following the 9/11 attacks on the United States, there have been attacks on the United Kingdom and Spain among others. Cases of terror attacks since 2001 have demonstrated our mutual insertion in a world where terrorism has increasingly become a common concern for everyone. Interestingly, unlike the dimension of the 2001 attacks where the attacks emanated from outside sources, terrorist attacks are increasingly coordinated by groups or individuals within the domain of the targeted state, raising concerns about the 'enemies that live amidst us'. The series of terrorist attacks in Europe and the Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria drive this point home as they point to the ever growing threats to national security from within the confines of the nation-state.

However, one of the biggest challenges to combating the menace of terrorism is that there is no consensus on what it means. Malcolm Shaw (2005: 1048) has identified three critical issues that the issue of terrorism raises in the context of international law:

1. The problem of definition
2. How widely should the concept be defined
3. The extent to which one should take into accounts the motives and intentions of the perpetrators.

Although, 'despite political difficulties, increasing progress at international and regional levels has been made to establish rules of international law with regard to terrorism,' Yet, the first challenge for anyone who seeks to define terrorism is how to surmount the limits imposed by the inherent political connotation that underpins the use of the concept.

As the meaning of the term has changed over the years, the term has grown to accommodate the political vernacular and discourse of each successive era. Terrorism has proved increasingly elusive in the face of attempts to construct a consistent definition. Early practitioners did not mince words or hide behind the semantic camouflage of more anodyne labels such as freedom fighter and urban guerrilla. For example, nineteenth century anarchists proclaimed themselves to be terrorists and openly declared their tactics to be terrorism and members of Narodnaya Volya likewise displayed no misgivings in using these same words to describe themselves and their actions (Hoffman, 1998).

Yet the treatment of terrorism in most academic literatures has been characteristically bias and this is so for two reasons:

1. Most accounts or definition of terrorism have always been critical of the perpetrators of the act. Thus, prejudging the act as inherently wrong and unjustifiable.
2. There is double standard in the way the term has or is often deployed e.g we are wont to see the ANC as a terrorist group but not the Apartheid government. This example for one raises crucial questions over whether the same standards of judgement should accompany acts of political violence whether they are committed by the state or by non-state actors (Valls 2000).

As Teichman (1989) cautions, we ought not to begin by calling terrorism a bad thing. This certainly is not an attempt to moralize what many observers and commentators see as inherently and expressly wrong but rather to cautiously subject terrorism to critical reasoning. Our ascription of a phenomenon as bad or otherwise must follow logically from the moral reasoning as well as an acknowledgement of the moral issues which the phenomenon implicates. In fact, as Virginia Held argues 'we should probably not construe either the intention to spread fear or the intention to kill non-combatants as necessary for an act of political violence to be an act of terrorism' (1991, cited in Valls, 2002). This point is corroborated by Annete Baier who contends that 'the terrorist may be ill named because what she sometimes wants is not to terrorize but 'the shock of her audience population' (1994, cited in Valls, 2002). But what Baier does not tell us is how this can be done without necessarily terrorizing the population.

From the foregoing observation however, one wonders whether the goal(s) of terrorist groups can be achieved without the instrumentality of fear. Whatever the case, it seems to



us that terrorist groups realize that swift response to their message or its riveting or penetrative spread is better achieved when a climate of fear is created rather than under a normal situation. Thus, for us, terrorism is an attempt to spread a message under an abnormal situation where creating, inventing or instilling fear in the population becomes a political capital for the message to be adequately transmitted. The term terrorism is used to describe the systematic inducement of fear and anxiety to control and direct a civilian population. According to Held, '...terrorism (is) a form of violence to achieve political goals were creating fear is usually among the intended effects' (1991, cited in Valls, 2002).

Terrorism appears in the form of new wars that challenge the traditional understanding of conflict as interstate war. Instead of inter-state, these new wars assume an intra-state dimension. Terrorism has given new meaning to domestic conflicts and redefined wars in various parts of the world, especially in the post Cold War era. Proponents of globalization maintained that the blending of cultures, which globalization brings, holds the prospects of reducing conflict in the world. However, true to Huntington's predictions, the post cold war international system has been characterized by "clash of civilizations", in which violence and conflict occurs along the lines of civilization and religion rather than among states or ideologies (Huntington, 1996).

The clash of civilization is a reaction to the civilizing adventurism of the West. The global spread of liberalism, in its political and economic dimensions, tend to have stirred broad unhappiness among religious fundamentalists against the impersonality and spiritual vacuity of liberal consumerist society. Basically, the Islamic world has seen in the cultural globalization, a technologically masked attempt to globalize Western culture and undermine their cultural and religious heritage. There is considerable suspicion among Muslims that there is a concerted effort by Western and Christian heritage countries to undermine their religion and cultural heritage. This led to the emergence of an international Islamic terrorist movement, made up of a loosely linked network of groups like al-Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, Hamas, Abu Sayef, the National Islamic Front, etc., with common aims of destroying the dominance of Western power and culture in the world (Lizardo, O; 2008 and Le Beau,2013.) The target of this terrorist network has now transcended the United States and its allies; rather it aims at attacking Western forces and institutions, wherever they are found, within or outside the territories of Western countries. Thus, terrorism which sprang from the international power dynamics among strong and weak states has infiltrated the domestic politics of nations, and has become ready instrument in the hands of competing factions of the political class.

In line with the foregoing, terrorism in Nigeria may be said to be a typical case of domestication of the global clash of civilizations, coinciding with grievances of disgruntled fragment of the elite who feel displaced in the change of power equation in the post military era, and seek to reassert themselves to political relevance with power strategy offered by the global wave terror. Thus, terrorism in Nigeria is partly attributable to the global clash of civilizations between the west and Islam. The terrorist group operating in Nigeria, the Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah Ladda'awatih wal-jihad, is popularly known as *Boko Haram*, which simply means "western education is evil". The principles and mode of operation of this group share a lot in common with the international terrorist network and there are indications that the group is likely linked with al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb. The group is strongly opposed to anything Western, which it sees as corrupting Muslims. It believes that interaction with the Western world is evil and prohibited (Warner, 2012 ; Roach 2012 & Pogason, 2013) . Thus, terrorist attacks in Nigeria maybe said to be part of the global Islamic attack on Western culture and institutions.

However, with the infiltration of this group by criminals and disgruntled politicians, terrorism also became a political strategy and a form of political behavior resulting from the deliberate choice of basically rational actors. Terrorism as a political choice in Nigeria is a result of elite disaffection, a strategy adopted by a fragment of the elite who feels they are not satisfied



with the prevailing power equation in the Nigerian state. Before now, such elite disaffection would have been expressed through a coup d'état. However, the era of globalization has ushered in a global democratic watch which has made an unconstitutional change of government very difficult and highly unattractive option. Against this background, a small minority without access to the power base and cannot overthrow the government through coup d'état or subversion, seek change through clandestine but violent means. The aggrieved camp of the elite usually resorts to the strategy of terrorism when subsisting conditions are neither revolutionary nor conducive for a revolution. Terrorism may thus be a sign of a stable society rather than a symptom of impending collapse (Crenshaw, 2006). Thus, terrorism becomes a tool in a blocked society that is strong enough to preserve itself yet resistant to change.

However, there is a controversy over whether Boko Haram is a terrorist group or not (Idahosa, 2015 & Walker, 2002). Indeed, regardless of how we make sense of its identity, what is most significant is that we are willing to take seriously the factor or combination of factors that may have produced the Boko Haram insurgency. Since 2010, Boko Haram attacks have become more vicious. Starting out as a religious sect in 2002, the group has undergone different phases, from a phase when it supposedly constituted no serious international threat to a phase in which the international community is beginning to take it more seriously. Indeed, the attack on the United Nations building in Abuja in June 2011 has helped in publicizing the group and its intent internationally. With attacks that are executed with great skill and competence, some have hinted at the possibility that the group has close collaboration with international terrorist groups. While it is increasingly claimed that Boko Haram has connections with Al Qaeda and other international terrorist organisations, the line connecting these groups is less than obvious.

Perhaps, the point in which the interests of Boko Haram intersects with that of Al Qaeda is no more than in their opposition to Western values, beyond this, the connecting lines between these groups have not been substantiated. As Mustapha notes, when Al-Qaeda speaks of the advances they have made in Africa, they mostly speak of Al Shabaab not Boko Haram. Yet while Boko Haram's connections with international terrorism may not be well founded, there are indications of international connections or aids that have helped in the execution of its activities. This, perhaps, is the extent to which the external environment is contributing to the Boko Haram onslaught.

Cyber Crime

Aside terrorism, another threat to national security is cybercrime. Cyber crimes are defined as offences that are committed against individuals or groups of individuals with a criminal motive to intentionally harm the reputation of the victim or cause physical or mental harm to the victim directly or indirectly using telecommunication networks such as internet (chat rooms, emails, notice boards and groups) and mobile phones (SMS/MMS) (Halder and Jaishankar, 2011). Such crimes may threaten a nation's security and financial health. Issues surrounding these kinds of crime have become high profile, particularly those surrounding cracking, copyright information, child pornography and child grooming. There are also problems of privacy when confidential information is lost or intercepted, lawfully or otherwise. Cybercrime may be subdivided into two. The first set of crimes is those that target computer networks; these are computer viruses, denial of service attacks and malicious codes (malwares). The second set of crime is those that use computer networks to further other ends such as cyberstalking, fraud and identity theft (Yahoo Yahoo), information warfare and phishing scams.

The difficulty of controlling cybercrimes derives generally from the very origin and nature of the internet, the platform on which these crimes are perpetrated. The internet is a multifaceted global network system of computerized information exchange, driven by information and communication technology. It is an interconnected system of networks



connecting computers around the world through a standard internet protocol suite known as Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) platform. It provides a platform upon which computers connect with other computers in multiple networks around the world. The internet is increasingly ubiquitous, fundamentally affecting the way human society works through the information technology revolution which has pervaded almost every aspect of human activities (European Convention on Human Rights, 2001).

Though being ubiquitous, it cannot be found physically anywhere because it is not a physical or tangible entity, even though it also comprises a physical layer. The internet was initially designed for academic research and non-profit activities. Thus, perhaps, the need to control the network or the behaviour of its users was not envisaged by the designers who deliberately fashioned it in such a way that it lacked a global control at the operations level (Chawki, 2005). Access to this cross-border information superhighway is unfettered and its usage unregulated. Being that the internet was initially used for academic research and non-profit activities, it was managed for this purpose until it was taken over by the US government and contracted to Government Systems Inc. in 1990, who allowed commercial interconnections in 1991 and widespread consumer application (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006). Then, the internet was thrown open to the public with unfettered accessibility of information. The internet became susceptible to a variety of purposes, providing virtual access to materials, information and e-commerce, with easier reach to businesses, products and services across borders. This translated into much power in the hands of individuals who can now easily trade data. With the absence of control mechanism in a seamless world where geography or physical contact are no longer necessary, users of the internet for e-commerce became vulnerable to some people who take advantage of the unfettered freedom and anonymity of internet usage to exploit and dupe unsuspecting victims. These people hide under the anonymity offered by the internet to illegally access the database of business enterprises for vital information, and purchase and contract services while misrepresenting as some important and creditworthy personalities (Gottschalk, 2010). Hacking and online fraud has become common place. Stolen credit card information can easily be used to make online purchases, without necessarily having the card, as would have been required for offline transactions (BBC, 2008). The wide range and variety of information accessible and unregulated open nature of the internet created conducive environment for social vices and criminal activities.

The internet is increasingly used as a tool and medium of transnational organized crime (Chawki, 2005). The advent of the internet and the cyberspace created avenue for the emergence and growth of innovative crimes hitherto unknown to both our social system and criminal law. An increasing number of criminals now use pagers, mobile phones, computers and network servers in the carrying out their online criminal activities like stealing of money, hacking into other people's computers, scam mail, stealing intellectual property, spreading viruses and worms to damage computers connected to the internet, defrauding unsuspecting businessmen etc. Though these cybercriminal are primarily motivated by pecuniary gains, there is growing evidence that many cite intrusions are carried out for reasons of espionage, blackmail, fraud and even terror.

Activities of cybercriminals have become a big challenge to network security with serious image problem for the country in international trade. The open, free, decentralized and unregulated nature of the cyberspace gives room for abuse and crime on the internet. Against this background, users make smart innovations on the cyberspace, having the ability to reach out to a large number of people even with fake identity. With the inability of the internet to discriminate contents, it has become a facilitator of criminal innovations and actually aids the innovators in carrying their criminal activities. Old crimes have gained more levers, while new ones are bred daily. The internet has become a haven for criminals. A total of 640 cybercrime complaints at 1.7 per day were reported in 1993; 971 at 2.6 per day in 1994; 1,494 in 1995; 4,322 in 1996; 12,715 in 1997; 47,000 in 1998; almost 100,000 in



1999; 280,000 in 2000; and by 2010 the complaint had reached two-million, on the average of 25,000 complaints per month (Internet Crime Center 2010 report). Thus, cybercrime has become somewhat attractive to some of the teeming unemployed youths in Nigeria.

Cybercrime in Nigeria has no doubt assumed lamentable proportions in recent times compromising the national security of the country and exposing its information management systems to grave danger with implications for e-commerce and e-banking. A 2007 Internet crime report listed Nigeria third in terms of online crime activity (PC World, 2008). One of the ways in which cyber crime is perpetrated is through phishing. Phishing is usually a social engineering crime pervasive in attacking organisations' or individuals' (customers') Information Systems (IS) in order to gather private information to be used against organisations through identity theft or identity deception acts (Rodger, 2008 cited in Wada & Odulaja 2012). Through Phishing, perpetrators are convinced to make available certain personal details with the impression that they are making available this information to genuine authorities. A good example was the phishing attack on customers of interswitch in January 2009, following the attacks, the management of Interswitch released a public notice on 12th of January alerting its customers of a fraudulent email to customers which sought to phish them of personal information.¹ These acts have deflated public confidence in online transactions and transactions via the automated teller machines (Wada & Odulaja, 2012).

Another means through which cybercrime is perpetrated is cyber terrorism. Indeed, when we remember that the September 11 terrorists made their air ticket reservations via an online platform called Travelocity.com, it becomes obvious to us the varying uses to which the internet can be put. Cyber terrorism, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, is any 'premeditated, politically motivated attack against information, computer systems, computer programs and data which results in violence against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents' (cited in Wada & Odulaja, 2012). Cyber terrorist attack is designed to cause physical violence or extreme financial harm, targets include the banking industry, military installations, power plants, air traffic control centers, and water systems. Another dimension is the use of cyber infrastructure to launder money to finance physical terrorism. In 2005, for example, FBI officials reported that Al Qaeda terrorist cells in Spain used stolen credit card information to make numerous purchases (cited in Wada & Odulaja, 2012).

In Romania, cyber terrorists gained access to the computers controlling the life support systems at an Antarctic research station, endangering the 58 scientists involved. However, the culprits were stopped before damage actually occurred (Poulsen, 2004). In May 2007, Estonia was subjected to a mass cyber-attack in the wake of the removal of a Russian World War II memorial from downtown Tallinn. The attack was a distributed denial-of-service onslaught in which selected sites were bombarded with traffic in order to force them offline. Nearly all Estonian government ministry networks as well as two major Estonian bank networks were knocked offline; in addition, the political party website of Estonia's Prime Minister Andrus Ansip featured a counterfeit letter of apology from the Prime Minister for removing the memorial statue. Despite speculation that the attack had been coordinated by the Russian government, Estonia's defence minister admitted he had no conclusive evidence linking cyber attacks to Russian authorities. Russia called accusations of its involvement groundless (Associated Press, 2009). Similarly, the website of Air Botswana, was defaced by a group calling themselves the "Pakistan Cyber Army," just as a disgruntled employee caused the release of untreated sewage into water in Maroochy Shire, Australia (Destination Nigeria, 2010).

The 2012 hacking of the Nigerian defence and naval security websites by cyber terrorist is a signal of cyber crime activities that are being perpetrated unchecked within the country. In

¹ The public notice can be accessed on spamfighter.com



2012, the then Chief of Defence Staff, Chief Air Marshal Oluseyi Petirin disclosed that the Defence Headquarters and Naval websites were attacked by hackers (Zimbio, 2012). In fact, the global wave of cyber terrorism worldwide is an indication that power is diffusing amongst a multiplicity of actors (Nye, 2011).

With the Boko Haram threat still pending, the Nigerian government is currently competing for space with Boko Haram on cyber. Indeed, considering the enormous security threat that the publicity of Boko Haram is gaining on the internet, it would have been expected that the security sector would step up its game in order to ensure that Boko Haram does not have easy access on the internet, this would have been a way of managing the air of insecurity that greeted the country in the wake of Boko Haram threat messages to schools, media houses, public installations and facilities etc. through the internet. The Chief of defence acknowledged that this was a problem in his remarks at the world cyber security conference held between the 18th and 20th of September in Asokoro, Abuja. He noted that the '...armed forces need to build more ICT capacity because the threat posed by the Boko Haram sect through online reports of their activities needs to be effectively checked' (Zimbio, 2012).

As at April 18 2012, the EFCC claims it had convicted more than 288 persons for various cases of cyber crime across the country. According to the EFCC, another 234 cases are still under prosecution in various courts nationwide while four fugitives have been extradited to the US. Also in the course of fighting 'interest fraud, EFCC seized counterfeit financial instruments worth N248 billion over the past one year – the fake financial instrument in different foreign currencies included dollars, pounds and Euros, noting that 'in 2011, the fake financial instruments seized by the commission in collaboration with the Nigerian postal service stood at \$24,213,208 (N3,793,970,000), £855,937 (N213, 299,000) and Euros1,195,218,214 (N244,427,000,000) (EFCCNigeria.org). These are only few incidents that are within the radar of the law enforcement agency. There are several others that are perpetrated unchecked and unhindered within the country, and the biggest challenge is how to build adequate capacity to stem the scourge as well as reform the laws in order to pursue the fight against cybercrime through legal regulations.

In spite of the challenge posed by cyber crime to national security, not much has been done to confront the problem. Yet, the negative effect of cybercrime is monumental. It has drastically reduced consumer confidence in e-commerce as prospective clients avoid online trading because of concerns about the integrity of the internet and fears that personal details such as credit card data and other confidential information might be compromised. The increasing wave of cybercrimes in Nigeria without much effort from the government to pass into law, the pending bills aimed at criminalising the acts, has been identified as a major threat to electronic transaction and e-commerce growth in the country. There have been calls for government to enact appropriate laws to criminalise some bad online behaviours while embarking on massive campaign on how to use the Internet as tool for job and wealth creation as alternative to online scam and cybercrime. Increasing shift of commerce to the Internet had been the trend in many part of the world. Regrettably, however, Nigeria is excluded from the list of countries that have embraced ecommerce. If the government wants the populace to transit from cash driven economy to an electronic or paperless economy it must be willing to fight cyber crime.

Trans-border Crimes

Equally important are trans-border crimes which in complex ways intersect with the two previous issues discussed. Trans-border crimes may be viewed as a set of criminal act whose perpetrators and repercussions transcend the territorial borders of any one state (Okeke ,V. O, S,, Oji & Okechukwu, R, 2014) . Once an issue restricted to network of drug dealers in Latin America and the Mafia in Italy, it has since assumed lamentable proportions across the world. In West Africa, it dates back to the 1990s with the outbreak and heightening of political unrest, centres of tension, community disputes within a number of



countries due to the way in which natural resources were managed and the way in which rebellions and civil wars were handled. These developments negatively impacted on neighbouring relations, worsened existing poverty and opened up avenues for criminal organisations that forged cross border and even trans-national networks. Trans-border crimes are most often the work of networked gangs of traffickers that receive at times support locally and from well structured sources across countries (United Nations, 2005). Trans-border crime violates human security, threatens peace, social harmony, political stability, good governance, development and sub-regional integration. Examples of trans-border crimes include:

- smuggling in contraband goods and illegal immigrants
- trafficking in weapons and human part
- drug trafficking
- vehicle crime
- trafficking of illegally exploited natural resources
- the illicit trade in timber, oil and diamond.

The common ways by which funds generated from this illegal means are made to appear legal is referred to as money laundering.

A study estimates funds involved in global money laundry much of which is gained from transnational crimes at between 2% and 5% of world economic output being dollar equivalent of between \$590billion to \$1.5trillion (Kligman 2004, cited in Osimen, G. U, Anegbode, E. J., Akande, C. A, Oyewole, O. O). At least 700,000 persons annually, mostly women and children, are trafficked within or across international borders. Many of these persons are trafficked into the international sex trade, often by force, fraud, or coercion. This growing transnational crime also includes forced labour and involves significant violations of labour, public health, and human rights standards worldwide (22 USC 7101: Purposes and findings). Since 1980, Nigeria has remained a major trans-shipment point for heroine and cocaine going to South Asia and Latin America respectively; apprehended suspects have been discovered to swallow drugs in wraps with a view to excreting them at destination countries.

Trafficking of contraband goods has haunted local industries. In 2004, Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) declared that the country lost 6.5billion dollars (about N800billion) to unwholesome trade practices of smuggling and product counterfeiting (The Guardian 2004 cited in Garuba 2010). Nigeria's border communities play important roles in smuggling activities, and due to years of neglect, border areas like Jibia in Katsina state, Kiisi in Oyo state, Idiroko in Ogun state, Bakassi in cross river state, Badagry in Lagos state and Bama in Borno state have become informal centers for substitute exchange relations. They have not only become grounds for informal, underground, black, irregular, economic centres but they have been transformed into sites for global criminal economic smuggling routes.

Illegal oil bunkering is another worrisome area of trans-border crimes. The Managing Director of Shell Petroleum Development Company put the loss resulting from illegal oil bunkering at over \$5billion annually and an approximately 150,000 barrels of oil per day. These estimates are unofficial figures and the actual losses could be even more. In acknowledgement of the insuperable odds it is confronting in its fight against illegal oil bunkering, the Federal Government recently contracted out the responsibility to the Global West Vessel Specialist Limited, a private firm owned by one time fugitive, Government Ekpemupolo popularly known as Tompolo (Saharareporters, 2012).

Arms Smuggling

By definition, small arms refer to arms used by one person and which include fire arms and other destructive arms or devices such as exploding bombs, incendiary bombs or gas bombs, grenades, rocket launchers, missiles, missile systems or landmines; revolvers and



pistols with automatic loading; rifles and carbines; machine guns; assault rifles and light machine guns.

Light weapons are portable arms designed to be used by several persons working together in a team, and which include heavy machine guns, portable grenade launchers, mobile or mounted portable anti-aircraft cannons; portable anti-tanks cannons, non-recoil guns; portable anti-tank missile launchers or rocket launchers; portable anti-aircraft missile launchers and mortars with a calibre of less than 100 millimetres (ECOWAS Convention on SALW cited in Onuoha, 2011).

Proliferation of small arms has been a major source of security concern in recent times. During the period of the Cold War, efforts at ensuring security were centered on eliminating the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. However, the world has come to a shocking realization that most injuries and deaths recorded in the internecine conflict in the post Cold War era involved the use of small arms and light weapons, and not weapons of mass destruction (Okiro, 2005). Since the end of the World War II in 1945, no one has been reported killed with weapons of mass destruction. However, tens of millions of those that have died since then were killed by cheap, mass produced weapons and small caliber ammunition which have flooded the countries of the World. These small arms are in wide circulation, especially in developing (African) countries, worsening the security situation in those countries. Attempts at curbing the circulation of these small arms have remained problematic. This has been worsened by widespread political crises in various parts of Africa, where many countries are either in a full blown civil war or near war political and security situation. Trade in small arms has remained lucrative for more developed countries that flood the continent with these weapons. (Seniora & Poitevin, 2010) *Managing Land Borders and the Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons* The proliferation of these small arms exacerbate insecurity, fuel intra-state conflict, encourage violent crime, aid ethno-religious violence, heighten political instability and volatility.

It is estimated that "out of the 640 million small arms circulating globally, ... 100 million are found in Africa about 30 million in sub-Saharan Africa and 8 million in West Africa, alone. The majority of these SALW about 59% are in the hands of civilians, 38% are owned by government armed forces, 2.8 % by police and 0.2% by armed groups. The gun trade is worth \$ 4 billion annually, of which up to \$ 1 billion may be unauthorized or illicit" (*The Guardian*, 2018 & Okeke, & Oji, 2014). The United Nations reviewed the growing spate of criminal activities in West Africa and acknowledged that \$35 million worth of small arms are imported to the sub region yearly (Jimoh & Oludare, 2017) . Proliferation of small arms have been single most important factor behind the escalation of conflicts in many African countries, including Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, DR Congo, Libya, and Ivory Coast. The rate of conflict in Africa has earned the status of zone of turmoil, while the intensity and extensity of violent crime have been described as criminal anarchy. Considering the number of casualties claimed by conflicts prosecuted with small arms in Africa, one can rightly describe these weapons as weapons of mass destruction in their own right. In July 2001, the US government estimated that small arms are fuelling conflicts in 22 countries across Africa, claiming between 7 to 8 million lives (Fleshman, 2011).

In Nigeria, several circumstances have promoted the proliferation of weapons; one of the most decisive causal factors is the Nigerian civil war. The number of weapons recovered in the eastern part of the country alone demonstrates the extent to which weapons proliferated in the course of the war. Deminers Concept Nigeria Limited, a company involved in the enumeration of mine victims, identification and marking of unexploded ordinances and demining exercises in the South-East of Nigeria – has revealed that it recovered over 17, 000 unexploded bombs from the zone. An estimated 300 unexploded bombs and improvised explosive devices are still believed to be buried in the region (Nwezeh 2010 cited in Onuoha 2011). Most of the weapons used in the war disappeared into the society as many ex-



soldiers carried their arms from the war front to their communities. Also, many of the local arms manufacturers used especially by the Biafran side had to use their skills to make a living after the war in meeting the demands of various criminals.

Okiro (2005), drawing from information available through the recovery of arms by the Nigerian Police and other security agents, puts sources of illegal small arms as follows:

a) Spillover effect from war-torn countries in the West African sub-region, like Liberia and Sierra Leone. Some illegal small arms find their way into Nigeria through refugees from these war-torn countries who sell them to ready buyers on arrival to the country. However, police and military personnel who returned from peacekeeping mission in these countries are also likely sources of these small arms.

b) Smuggling: Unwholesome activities of smugglers at Nigeria's porous borders have become a menace proving difficult to be curbed by the Nigeria Customs Service (NCS). Gun running has become a very lucrative criminal business in the country against the background of porous borders. a total of 21,548,608 arms and ammunition were smuggled into Nigeria at the close of 2017 (*The Nigerian Tribune*, 2018). According to the *Nigerian Tribune*, in 2014, 1,142 live cartridges of 12 grammes were seized at the Murtala Mohammed Airport Customs command in Lagos, on February 26, 2014, while 30,000 live cartridges of 7.2mm were intercepted at Saki, Oyo State, on March 11, 2014. On June 18, 2014, 120 jack knives were seized in Sokoto State, while one Remington pistol and 20 cartridges intercepted at the Murtala Mohammed Airport Customs command in Lagos on December 24, 2014. It added that 2017, a total of 150 live round of 9mm bullets were seized at the Lagos Airport on February 10, 2017, while 661 pump action guns were intercepted along Mile 2 axis of the Apapa-Oshodi highway on January 30, 2017. In May 2017, 440 pump action guns were seized at Tin-Can ports in September, just a haul of 1,100 pump action guns were intercepted at same port in Lagos (*The Nigerian Tribune*, 2018)

. There are about 1000 illegal smuggling routes, which form a network of roads around Idi-Iroko in the Egbado area of Ogun state. Another route for arms smuggling in Nigeria is the Niger Delta, especially Warri. In the North, Nigeria shares boundaries with Niger Republic, Cameroon and Chad Republic and large scale arms smuggling is carried out there. These borders in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states provide ready routes for fleeing arms from conflicts in Chad, Niger and Sudan. Also, small arms are also smuggled through international airports.

c) Local manufacturers: Local arms manufacturers located in remote areas produce arms for armed robbers, assassins, vigilante groups, militias and individuals seeking self-help.

d) Security agents: Some security agents allegedly serve as source of arms to members of the underworld (Anumba-Khaleel, 2017). Newspapers headlines are pointers to the realities of arms influx into Nigeria – 'Bad elements in the security agencies selling arms to bandits – DSS'; 'DSS blames military, security agencies for proliferation of arms'; 'DSS, customs accuse politicians, states of stockpiling arms'; and 'three policemen arrested for selling AK-47 rifles to robbers' amongst others. (*The Guardian*, 2017). Also, members of the underworld take possession of abandoned arms used by security agents after succeeding in overpowering or killing them during confrontations. In 2000, about 29 police officers were killed in Lagos and their arms taken away by the robbers that killed them (Post Express, 29 July, 2001).

Added to these, is the bitterly contested nature of politics in the country, which has led to a situation in which politicians recruit thugs who are used to perpetrate acts of violence during elections ranging from assassination to intimidation of political opponents, for this purpose weapons smuggled through the country and in other cases, legitimately accessed are used



in furtherance of the intents of politicians and their allies. Indeed, for this purpose, trans-border criminals smuggling arms have found the Nigerian market a fertile ground for the smuggling and sale of their goods. This has increased the quantity of arms in circulation in the country particularly in the hands of non-state agents.

The impact of the proliferation of arms is that it perpetuates conflict so that even after the acts for which the weapons were originally deployed may have been achieved those in possession of these arms find them useful for their own personal uses. These weapons come in handy for acts of robbery, intimidation of innocent civilians and for building resistance against the forces of the state in cases where there is a fall-out in agreement reached before elections or after.

Conclusion

The security environment of nation-states has become increasingly complex and dynamic. The global security environment and the changes that have occurred in it are now projected on the internal security environment of nation-states. The security environment is undergoing rapid and constant change. Global security issues, such as terrorism, cybercrime, transborder crimes and arms proliferation exemplify the inseparability of internal and external security. The multifaceted cause-effect relationships and formation mechanisms of these issues, and the constantly transforming interaction, make operating in the security environment even more complex and forecasting its development more challenging (Tiimonen & Nikander, 2016). The external environment, which traditionally used to be seen as the primary source of threat to the state has become more or less interwoven with the domestic environment. Thus, the external and internal security environments have become interlaced on multiple levels as a complex whole. This has complicated the security situation of the Nigerian state, like other less developed countries, with fledgling state institutions in the face of overpowering forces of globalisation. As a result, there is need to approach the security environment of the state from the growing interconnection between the external and the internal environments in the areas of their complex formation mechanisms, mutual causations and the extensive nature of their social impact. The security threats and forces driving the changing security context are often located far beyond boundaries of the Nigerian state. Widespread immigration into Nigeria, occasioned by regional conflicts, worsening socioeconomic conditions and porous borders are stretching and challenging the traditional security apparatuses of the state. This calls for the development of more proactive security operating models to provide broad support for anticipating and containing security threats. The development requires security actors to examine security in a wider scope, past actor-specific sector borders, and to cooperate more comprehensively and proactively.



REFERENCES

- Adu Boahen, A. ed. 1985 *General History Of Africa- VII Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-1935* Berkeley: University of California Press
- Anderson, B. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London and New York: Verso.
- Anumba-Khaleel, K., 2017. DSS Fingers Security Agents in Arms Proliferation November 13, 2017 Leadership: <https://leadership.ng/2017/11/13/dss-fingers-security-agents-arms-proliferation/>
- Ashcroft, B., Gareth G. and Tiffin, H 1998. *Post-colonial Studies: The Key Concepts*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Azimazi M. J. and Oludare R., 2017 West Africans import \$35 million small arms yearly, says UN The Guardian 08 December 2017 <https://guardian.ng/news/west-africans-import-35-million-small-arms-yearly-says-un/>
- Chawki, M. 2005. *A Critical Look at the Regulation of Cybercrime*. Available at <http://www.droit-tic.com/pdf/chawk14.pdf>
- BBC 2008 "Plastic card fraud goes back up". 12 March 2008 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7289856.stm>
- Caute, D. 1978. *The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Chawki, M. 2005. *A Critical Look at the Regulation of Cybercrime*. Available at <http://www.droit-tic.com/pdf/chawk14.pdf>
- Crenshaw, M. 2006. "The Causes of Terrorism", in O'Neil P.H. and Rogowski, R. eds. *Essentials of Comparative Politics*. 2nd edn. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Destinationnigeria 2010, 'cyberterrorism hits Nigeria' extracted via <http://newafricanpress.com/2010/09/25/cyber-terrorism-hits-nigeria/>
- Ebenstein, A. 2002. *Introduction to Political Thinkers*. Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth
- European Convention on Human Rights, 2001 <https://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/bills/2001/2601/b2601.pdf>
- EFCCNigeria.org, '288 jailed for Internet fraud' extracted via http://www.efccnigeria.org/20120416_288%20Jailed.html
- Executive Summary, IC3 2010 Internet Crime Report, available at http://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2010_IC3Report.pdf
- Fleshman, M. 2011 Small Arms In Africa Counting The Cost Of Gun Violence *Africa Renewal*: December 2011
- Fried, R. M. 1990. *Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gat, A. 2006. *War in Human Civilization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Goldsmith, J. and Wu, T. 2006. *Who Controls the Internet, Illusions of a Borderless World*. New York: Oxford Press
- Halder, D., & Jaishankar, K. 2011 [Cyber crime and the Victimization of Women: Laws, Rights, and Regulations](#). Hershey, PA, USA: IGI Global.
- Hobson, J. M. and Hobden, S. eds. 2002. *Historical Sociology of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hoffman, B.. 1998 *Inside Terrorism* New York: Columbia University Press.



- Holy, L. 2010. "A net neutrality compromise harms privacy, spreads cybercrime," Technorati (31 August), at <http://technorati.com/technology/article/a-net-neutrality-compromise-harms-privacy/>, accessed 28 October 2017.
- Huntington, S. 1996. *The Clash of Civilisation and Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Idahosa, O. 2015 Boko Haram and the Nigerian State: a Different Perspective Glocalism. *Journal of Culture, Politics and Innovation* Issue 2015, 3
- Jeyifo, B. 2007. 'In the wake of Colonialism and Modernity' in Olaniyan, T. and Quayson, A. eds. *African Literature: An Anthology of Criticism and Theory*. London: Blackwell Publishers.
- Gaskin, J.C.A (ed.) 1998 *Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan* Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Gottschalk, P., 2010 *Policing Cyber Crime* Bookboon.com <http://library.ku.ac.ke/wp-content/downloads/2011/08/Bookboon/IT,Programming%20and%20Web/policing-cyber-crime.pdf>
- Kant, I. 1795 *Perpetual Peace: 'A Philosophical Sketch'* Berkeley nColumbia University Press https://slought.org/media/files/perpetual_peace.pdf
- Le Beau, John J.ed. 2013. *The Dangerous Landscape: International Perspectives on Twenty-First Century Terrorism; Transnational Challenge, International Responses* The Partnership for Peace Consortium's Combating Terrorism Working Group (CTWG) <http://www.procon.bg/>
- Lizardo, O. 2008 Defining and Theorizing Terrorism: A Global Actor-Centered Approach *Journal of World-Systems Research*, XIV(2), 91-118
- Nye, J.S. 2011. *The Future of Power*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Okeke, V.O.S & Oji, R. O. 2014 The Nigerian State and the Proliferation Small Arm and Light Weapons in the Northern Part of Nigeria *Journal of Educational and Social Research*, 4(1)
- Okeke ,V. O, S., Oji & Okechukwu, R . 2014. Cross Border Crimes in West African Sub- Region: Implications for Nigeria's National Security and External Relations *Global Journal of Human-Social Science: F Political Science* https://globaljournals.org/GJHSS_Volume14/5-Cross-Border-Crimes-in-West-African.pdf Volume 14 Issue 3 Version 1.0
- Okiro, M. 2005. Proliferation of Illegal Arms and Ethno-Religious Violence in Nigeria. Alemika, E.O. and Chukwuma, I.C. *Crime and Policing in Nigeria: Challenges and Options*. Network on Police Reform in Nigeria.
- Onuoha, F.C. 2011. 'Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation and Human Security in Nigeria' *Conflict Trend* (1), 50-56
- Osimen, G. U, Anegbode, E. J., Akande, C. A,& Oyewole, O. O 2017 The Borderless-Border and Internal Security Challenges in Nigeria. *International Journal of Political Science*, 3(3), 17-27
- Paleri, P. 2008. *National Security: Imperatives and Challenges* . New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill.
- PC World 2008. 'Microsoft combats cybercrime in Nigeria' extracted via http://www.pcworld.com/article/152784/nigeria_cybercrime.html
- Pogonson, A. I. 2013. *Nigeria's National Security in an Age of Terrorism* Ibadan Department of Political Science
- Pong, D. 2017. *The Fall of the Qing, 1840-1912* <http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199920082/obo-9780199920082-0029.xml>
- Poulsen, K. 2004 South Pole 'cyberterrorist' hack wasn't the first Threat over-egged *The Registrar*, 19 August 2004 https://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/08/19/south_pole_hack/
- Premaratne, U. 2016. Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Use of Reasonable Consequentialism for the Conundrum of National Security and Fundamental Rights. KDU International Research Conference 2016.Cited in Joshua James *Climate Change And National Security Analysis Of The New Zealand*



- Roach, M. L. 2012. Boko Haram: Addressing the threat before it strikes. Issue brief 3549. Washington, D.C., The Heritage Foundation. pp. 1-4. Available from: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?rls=1T4NDKB_enTR519TR519&q=cache:emCTwWAlDR0J:http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/ib3549.pdf%2BRoach,+M.+L.,+2012.+Boko+Haram:+Addressing+the+Threat+before+It+Strikes&hl=tr&ct=clnk
- Ripsman, N. M., and T. V. P. 2010). *Globalization and the National Security State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Romm, J. J. 1993. Defining National Security: The Nonmilitary Aspects. Pew Project on America's Task in a Changed World (Pew Project Series). Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 22 September 2017.
- Saharareporters 2012. 'Tompolo: The Millionaire Militant' extracted via <http://saharareporters.com/news-page/tompolo-billionaire-militant-thenews-africa>
- Seniora, J. and Poitevin, C. 2010, *Managing Land Borders and the Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons* Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP) <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/web/documents/other/jihansenioraandcedricpoitevin4f71888d11286.pdf>
- Scherer, L. S. 2010. *National Security*. Detroit: Greenhaven Press
- Schrecker, E. 1998. *Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America*. Boston: Little, Brown..
- Shaw, M. 2005. *International Law*. Cambridge University Press
- Silva, A. 2016. *Early Beginnings of Holy Roman Rule: Church Politics in the Sustaining of the Western Empire (4th-8th Centuries)* https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/163229/Master%20Thesis_Andre%20Silva_014414734.pdf?sequence=2
- Strong, A. L. 1941. *The Soviets Expected It*. New York, New York: The Dial Press
- Strong, A. L. 1956 *The Stalin Era*. New York: Mainstream
- Teichman, J. 1989 How to Define Terrorism *Philosophy*, Vol. 64, No. 250 (Oct.)
- Tiimonen, H. and Nikander, M. 2016 *Interdependence of Internal and External Security Will the Operational Culture Change With The Operational Environment?* Finland: Ministry of Interior Publication 37.
- This Day Live 2012, 'Growing menace of cybercrime' extracted via <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/growing-menace-of-cybercrime/125466/>
- The Associated Press. 2009 A look at Estonia's Cyber Attack in 2007 http://www.nbcnews.com/id/31801246/ns/technology_and_science-security/t/look-estonias-cyber-attack/#.Wr6frcYwjlU
- The Guardian, Editorial Board 26 November 2017 When security agencies sell arms to criminals <https://guardian.ng/opinion/when-security-agencies-sell-arms-to-criminals/>
- The Guardian, 2018 The influx of small arms, light weapons 22 February 2018 <https://guardian.ng/opinion/the-influx-of-small-arms-light-weapons/>
- The Nigerian Tribune, 2018 21 Million Guns, Ammo Smuggled Into Nigeria —Investigation January 21, 2018 <http://www.tribuneonlineng.com/21-million-guns-ammo-smuggled-nigeria-investigation/>
- Thucydides & Crawley, William, 1840-1893 (1951). *The Peloponnesian War*. Modern Library, New York
- Trombetta, M. J. 2008 Environmental Security And Climate Change: Analysing The Discourse, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 21:4, 585-602:
- UNITED NATIONS 2005. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Vienna Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region https://www.unodc.org/pdf/transnational_crime_west-africa-05.pdf



Valls A. 2000. 'Can Terrorism Be Justified' Pojman L. P *Political Philosophy: Classis and Contemporary Readings* (pp. 563-572). NY: McGraw Hill.

Vanguard 2011 A-L-A-R-M-I-N-G 124 policemen in Lagos killed by bandits in 9 months <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/11/a-l-a-r-m-i-n-g-124-policemen-in-lagos-killed-by-bandits-in-9-months/>

Wada, F. & Odulaja, G. O. 2012)Assessing Cyber Crime and its Impact on E-Banking in Nigeria Using Social Theories. *African Journal of Computing & ICT*. Vol 5. No. 1. pp 69-82.

Walker, A. What Is Boko Haram? 2012 by the United States Institute of Peace. *Special Report* <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR308.pdf>

Waltz, K. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw Hill.

Warner, Z. 2012. The Sad Rise of Boko Haram. *New African*, 01 April,

Watson, C. A. (2008). *U.S. National Security: A Reference Handbook* . Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO.

Zimbio 2012, 'Cyberterrorist hack defence Headquarters and Navy websites' extracted via <http://www.zimbio.com/Nigeria+Today/articles/XAs8P5ETosA/Cyber+terrorist+hack+Defence+Headquarters>

22 USC 7101: Purposes and findings: From Title 22-Foreign Relations and Intercourse Chapter 78-Trafficking Victims Protection [http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=\(title:22%20section:7101%20edition:prelim\)](http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:22%20section:7101%20edition:prelim))